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THE TAKINGS-PUZZLE PUZZLE
JAMES E. KRIER"
Regulatory takings are widely regarded as a puzzle. Whether
from the standpoint of merely trying to describe judicial doc-
trine, or from the more ambitious standpoint of trying to nor-
malize the doctrine in some way-finding the theory that can
"rationalize the cases," or the theory that should-the opening
clich6 in most of the scholarly commentary is that the law in
this area is a bewildering mess. We can go back thirty years,
more-or-less, and find statements to that effect in classic articles
by Joe Sax and Frank Michelman.' We can skip forward to re-
cent work and observe the same.2 We can also take it on faith
(trust me) that most of the scholarly literature in between
shares the sentiment?
My aim here is to unpack the regulatory takings problem in a
way that suggests why it is intractable. The idea is to reveal
some of the different types of ambiguity necessarily entailed in
* Earl Warren DeLano Professor of Law, University of Michigan. This Article is
based on my remarks at the Institute of Bill of Rights Law Symposium on Defining
Takings: Private Property and the Future of Government Regulation, held at the
College of William & Mary School of Law on April 11, 1996. My thanks go to the
conference organizers and participants for their comments.
1. See, respectively, Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36,
37 (1964) ("[T]he predominant characteristic of this area of law is a welter of confus-
ing and apparently incompatible results."); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1967) (stating that the courts' takings decisions reveal 'jarring
outcomes" that are "liberally salted with paradox"). The abstract of Michelman's article
refers to the "bewildering array of rules" found in takings cases. Id.
2. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings
Puzzle, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 147, 147 (1995) ("Many commentators and prac-
titioners, ranging from property rights advocates to police power hawks, have viewed
the Supreme Court's takings cases as incoherent, piecemeal, or categorical.").
3. See, e.g., Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying
Principles, Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV.
1299, 1303-04 (1989) ([]t is difficult to imagine a body of case law in greater doc-
trinal and conceptual disarray.").
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takings cases. Seeing these ambiguities, we readily can under-
stand why the doctrine in this area is so confused and confusing;
why there is, in short, a "takings puzzle." To my mind, it is
much more difficult to understand why anyone would expect
matters to be otherwise. This oddity I call the "takings-puzzle
puzzle."
It seems to me that takings cases routinely give rise to at least
three different kinds, and different levels, of ambiguity and un-
certainty. The first and most superficial kind was suggested in an
article by Douglas Kmiec.4 Professor Kmiec claimed that the
Supreme Court, thanks to several of its recent decisions, "largely
has solved the takings puzzle."5 He didn't mean by this that all of
the uncertainties about regulatory takings doctrine have sud-
denly vanished; what he meant, instead, is that the Court has, in
his view, settled on general principles. Kmiec acknowledged,
however, that the uncertainty of applying those principles re-
mains intact. 'The takings puzzle has been solved," he said, but
"specific applications always will remain contentious."'
I don't believe that the takings puzzle has been solved in the
sense that Kmiec meant, but put that aside. The point remains
that even very clearly settled principles commonly will give rise
to uncertainty, and thus to some degree of unpredictability,
about how to apply the principles. For example, standard tak-
ings doctrine plainly holds that government regulations result-
ing in permanent physical occupations are always takings.7 But
when is an occupation "permanent"? Indeed, when does a gov-
ernment regulation even work an occupation or invasion that is
cognizable for takings purposes? The answers to these questions
are not at all obvious, so the questions themselves present some-
thing of a puzzle.'
4. See Kmiec, supra note 2.
5. Id. at 147.
6. Id. at 158.
7. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). By
way of contrast, temporary invasions "are subject to a more complex balancing pro-
cess to determine whether they are a taking." Id. at 435 n.12.
8. See, e.g., id. at 448-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Note also that the majority
opinion in Loretto suggested that an easement of passage is not a permanent occu-
pation, id. at 433, whereas the majority opinion in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987), suggested that it is.
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To cite another example of the same problem, it is clear that
government regulations are takings if they effectively wipe out
the value of regulated land, unless the land uses targeted by the
regulations amount to nuisances under the terms of a state's
common law.9 As Kmiec noted, however, "[nluisance law is im-
precise,"' ° so substantial uncertainty arises even in the course
of applying settled doctrine.
We need not belabor the obvious. Takings doctrine simply can-
not escape this first kind of uncertainty and confusion that I
have been discussing, even when takings principles are settled
and clear. Consider now a second kind and level of ambiguity
and uncertainty, one having to do with arguments about what
our general principles of law in this area should be. Here, uncer-
tainties arise that are more fundamental than those found in
the first kind of ambiguity that I identified, more fundamental
in the sense that one initially needs to settle on the frame with-
in which to ponder the more mundane issues of applying the
general to the particular. Carol Rose has discussed this problem
in the context of regulatory takings:
In takings doctrine, the tradition of property's civic respon-
sibility is embodied in a test that balances public benefits
against private losses from a particular measure. This [bal-
ancing] test baffles legal commentators who take a neoclassi-
cal economic approach. From a Benthamite point of view, this
[balancing] test might be relevant to the utility of the pro-
posed measure, but would have no bearing at all on the issue
of compensation: if the public needs property, it may acquire
it, but must still pay for it. The premise of this [balancing]
takings test, however, is quite the reverse; that is, that citi-
zens may be required to sacrifice and bear private losses in
the face of a substantially greater public need.
Thus, the arguments about disturbing established expecta-
tions take two very different directions: one would protect the
acquisitive faculties which bring wealth and strength; the
other would protect the citizen independence and participa-
tion which enhance the community, but would thereafter
raise no principled objections to redistribution ....
9. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
10. Kmiec, supra note 2, at 154.
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This tension between the two arguments helps explain
why the takings problem is so intractable.11
Notice that Professor Rose observed a pair of opposing prin-
ciples; one-on-one contests between two competing principles
seem fairly typical in the context of regulatory takings. There
is the classical-liberal/classical-republican debate to which Rose
alluded, the courts-should-decide/legislatures-should-decide
argument,12 the debate about ordinary versus scientific points
of view, the fairness/utility (Kantian/Utilitarian) debate,1 and
so on.
In order to resolve such differences of opinion about theories
on takings-to reach consensus, to settle upon a frame and get
rid of the second level of uncertainty, leaving only the first level
(which always will be present)-one needs in essence some kind
of metatheory that can bring the disparate voices into harmony.
But, of course, there is no one universal metavantage point
shared by everybody, much less a metametatheory to lead to
such a metatheory to lead to a single theory, etc. There are just
big, long arguments -about first principles, the bedrock on which
all else ultimately depends. I think that Professor Rose had this
most fundamental kind of uncertainty in mind when she ex-
pressed the view that our inability to reconcile different theoreti-
cal positions on takings "in any principled way suggests the in-
adequacy of our existing political vocabulary." 4 It is time, she
said, "to change the subject and generate a more promising vo-
cabulary by examining the issue in another manner."5 But
11. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle,
57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 593-94 (1984).
12. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLI-
TICS (1995). For a summary of the debate, see, for example, id. at 4-5; James E.
Krier, Takings from Freund to Fischel, 84 GEO. L.J. 1895 (1996) (book review). See
also William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 782 (1995) (giving an account of the
Framers' views of the Takings Clause).
13. For a discussion of ordinary versus scientific points of view, and on Kantian
versus Utilitarian outlooks, see BRUCE A. AcKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1977).
14. Rose, supra note 11, at 596.
15. Id. at 597.
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which other manner? There are competing alternatives, and not
all of us would make the same choice as Professor Rose.
So we have at least three distinct types of uncertainty or am-
biguity entailed in the resolution of regulatory takings. The first
arises from application of general principles to particular situa-
tions, the second from theoretical differences regarding what the
general principles should be, and the third from divergent
metatheoretical approaches to arguments over theory. Such a
mix can create confusion enough, but the necessary interaction
among the types of uncertainty promotes even more. The types
are, so to speak, "geared" to each other, such that their joint op-
erations can be unpredictable to a fault. The kind of uncertainty
entailed in applying general principles to particular concepts
always will provoke contentiousness, as Kmiec noted earlier.16
No matter the frame selected, there will be conflicting judg-
ments about what fits within it, and the resulting conflicts will
suggest a state of disarray. That impression, of course, is only
heightened by the fact that there will be disagreements within
disagreements, by which I mean:
(1) Persons A and B might agree on one principle yet argue
about its application; persons C and D might agree on another
principle yet argue about its application. (This pattern of agree-
ment on general principles but arguments about the particulari-
ties gives rise to the first kind of ambiguity that I identified)."
(2) But all the while it might be less than clear to any of them
(or any of us) that the A-B group is framing matters one way (in
terms of one principle) while the C-D group is standing on differ-
ent theoretical ground, such that it is difficult or impossible to
discern why some facts are regarded as important and others
are not. There is uncertainty about the underlying principle or
theory (the second kind of ambiguity), and it can exacerbate the
uncertainty arising from a principle's application.
(3) Even if the underlying theoretical debate between the A-B
group on the one hand and the C-D group on the other is rea-
16. See supra text accompanying note 6.
17. For just one example of this type of ambiguity, see my discussion of the dis-
agreements among a group of people who subscribe together to a "process" point of
view, in Krier, supra note 12, at 1909-10.
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sonably apparent, how and why either group decided on one
frame as opposed to any other of the contending frames often
will be obscure. This is the metatheoretical ambiguity.
Andrea Peterson has put all of these points together in de-
scribing the messiness of takings decisions by the United States
Supreme Court:
The Court also has announced at least four different tests
for determining when a "taking" occurs, without explaining
why its inquiry should differ from one takings case to the
next or providing clear guidelines as to when each takings
test should be applied. The Court has even used more than
one takings test in a single opinion. Even when the Court
confines itself to only one of its announced tests, the struc-
ture of the Court's analysis is difficult to predict, for the
Court's interpretation of each takings test can vary from one
opinion to the next.
If one focuses on the Court's articulation of the principles
underlying its takings doctrine, its decisions fare no better.
The Court has repeatedly stated that the ultimate issue in a
takings case is whether "fairness and justice" require that
compensation be paid for economic injuries caused by the
government. Yet the Court has provided little explanation of
how its present array of takings tests bear[s] on the fairness
issue."
In sum, that there's a "takings puzzle" is easy enough to un-
derstand. "The takings issue is muddy because it is inherently
hard to deal with," William Fischel has said,19 and for the rea-
sons I have suggested that seems exactly right to me. What
seems wrong is that people are so puzzled by this "puzzle," be-
cause the problems that I have been discussing are so pervasive,
so common to virtually any substantive legal field, that one
would expect everybody to expect them.
As an example, consider the law of torts and its treatment of
accidents, beginning with the familiar regime-negligence doc-
trine. The law of negligence is a body of very general principles
18. Peterson, supra note 3, at 1304.
19. FISCHEL, supra note 12, at 325.
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designed to govern an amazingly diverse array of human inter-
actions (diversity, obviously, is the very feature that motivates
the generality of the governing law; the alternative would be a
code of conduct of unwieldy length and complexity, and one that
would no doubt be shortsighted in any event). Necessarily, a lot
of uncertainty is involved in applying general negligence princi-
ples to particular cases. By definition, general principles have
vague boundaries (for example, what is "reasonable"?) tested at
the margin by individual instances. The core may be both solid
and clear but the perimeter is neither, and there is reason to
suppose that litigated cases will not be core cases. Cases in the
core will be settled prior to trial.
The kind of guessing that arises in the course of applying gen-
eral negligence principles to particular cases is taken for grant-
ed, just as one would suppose, because it is confronted so regu-
larly in any substantive field. In a particular contracts case,
what provisions are "unconscionable"? In a particular homicide
case, when is there "premeditation"? In the case of a contested
will, what was the deceased's "intention"? In a custody matter,
what is "in the best interests of the child"? And so on.
Now take the law of torts again and consider the academic
debate about negligence versus strict liability." The question
arises whether a given kind of accident should be governed by
the reasonableness standard of negligence, or instead by the
more categorical rule of strict liability. Whichever alternative is
chosen, the first kind of ambiguity, discussed above, will persist.
What is "unreasonable" in the case of allegedly negligent behav-
ior? What is a "defect," or an "abnormally dangerous activity," in
the case of behavior alleged to give rise to strict liability? Now
the second kind and level of ambiguity also comes into play. Am-
biguity in this instance derives from competing notions about
which principle (here, the principle of negligence or the principle
of strict liability) to apply to a given situation. As we saw in dis-
cussing regulatory takings, this second level of uncertainty is
more fundamental than the first. To resolve it, we need to reach
agreement on bedrock principles, which is very unlikely to occur.
20. For a quick summary, see RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
175-80 (4th ed. 1992).
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So Professor Fischel is right that takings are "inherently hard
to deal with."2' The trouble is that a lot of questions in the le-
gal world are inherently hard to deal with-and are so for the
same reasons that takings questions are-yet, so far as I can
see, all of those hard questions taken together have provoked
nowhere near the claims of Babel that run through the takings
literature.
This, as I said, is what puzzles me. I presume that the answer
to the takings-puzzle puzzle has at least something to do with
our particular situation in the United States. Private ownership
has been a central part of our economic and political history from
the outset; activist government has become central, especially
over the last half century or so. And it is over that latter period
of time in particular-over the last fifty years-that the subject
of takings has come to capture so much attention from legal
commentators and (most recently) the public at large. Ambiguity
and uncertainty, however typical they might happen to be, are
likely to provoke unusual anxiety when we sense them at the
heart of our political-economic system. Whether we address tak-
ings through the courts, through legislation, or by some other
means, the same bewildering questions will persist. They inhere
not in the topic of takings but in the nature of law. In the context
of takings, however, persistent puzzles have a special salience.
21. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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